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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
benefit when a housing authority eliminates a slum, but this activity has
been considered a public purpose in North Carolina since Wells was de-
cided in 1938.
The dissent's concern with the indirectness of the efforts of the
Housing Corporation in eliminating inadequate housing is likewise an-
swered in part by the existing case law. The court has upheld the dis-
cretion of housing authorities in locating their projects on sites not
presently in a slum area.55 Thus the court has not insisted in every in-
stance on the most direct attack on the slum to sustain a finding of public
purpose. This view is consistent with the development of the law follow-
ing Berman whereby "[h]ousing projects for persons of low income
alone, without provisions for slum clearance, became objects for which the
power of eminent domain could be exercised."5 6 In Martin the court found
sufficient nexus between the activities of the Housing Corporation and the
elimination of the shortage of low cost housing, and such minimal in-
trusion into the private arena that the activities could be sustained as
pursuant to a proper governmental function and thus for a public purpose.
In so holding the court acted in the context of existing case law without
overruling Mitchell, which can be seen as blocking deep-seated involve-
ment in the affairs of private enterprise. Nevertheless, the analytical tools
of Martin afford the means to modify the Mitchell result should the pur-
pose sought be of sufficient social importance, the means chosen sufficiently
direct, and the degree of intrusion into the private sphere sufficiently cir-
cumscribed.
KENNETH C. DAY
Personal Jurisdiction-Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporation Based
Upon Maling a Contract in North Carolina
Courts can obtain personal jurisdiction over nonregistered foreign
corporations by the use of long-arm statutes.' International Shoe Co. v.
"E.g., Housing Auth. v. Wooten, 257 N.C. 358, 126 S.E.2d 101 (1962); In re
Housing Authority, 233 N.C. 649, 65 S.E.2d 761 (1951)." Comment, 1969 LAw & Soc. OnDER, supra note 32, at 697.
'For a brief review of the development of the long-arm statute, see McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The important thing to re-
member about long-arm statutes is that the mere ability to fit a situation within a
statute's language does not mean that jurisdiction will always be proper. The ulti-
mate test is the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment-not the wording of
the long-arm statute. Id. at 222.
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LONG-ARM STATUTES
Washington2 and cases which have followed' have expanded in personam
jurisdiction, especially over foreign corporations. However, problems
still arise out of situations involving a single contract made by a foreign
corporation within the forum state. The North Carolina Supreme Court
considered such a situation in Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc.4 Plain-
tiff Goldman, a North Carolina resident, sued Parkland, a Texas corpora-
tion, for breach of contract. Under the contract, Goldman was to serve as
manufacturer's representative for Parkland in the sale of dresses in several
Southeastern states, including North Carolina.5 The contract terms were
discussed in Atlanta, but the court found that the contract was executed
when Goldman signed an offer sent to him by Parkland and dropped it
into a mailbox in North Carolina.6 Parkland never had a representative in
North Carolina other than Goldman. The contract's connections with
North Carolina were that it was executed there, and by its terms was to be
performed there to some extent. Goldman alleged that he had performed
under this contract for several months prior to Parkland's breach, had
done most of 'his work in North Carolina, and had sold a quantity of the
dresses there.' The court found these contacts sufficient to satisfy the
long-arm statute.8
North Carolina's long-arm statute seems to provide two conditions
which can give rise to jurisdiction over foreign corporations making con-
tracts with state residents. The statute subjects them to suit in the state
on any cause of action arising "out of any contract [either] made in this'
State or to be performed in this State."9 In Goldman the court avoided
decision of a constitutional question-whether either condition alone will
2326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2'E.g., Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 3,55 U.S. 220 (1957).
'277 N.C. 223, 176 S.E.2d 784 (1970).
' The terms of the contract are presented in some detail in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 7 N.C. App. 400, 173 S.E.2d
15 (1970).
8277 N.C. at 227, 176 S.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 229, 176 S.E.2d at 788.
Id.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a) (1965) provides:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State, by a
resident of this State or by a person having a usual place of business in this
State, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has trans-
acted business in this State and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in
interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows:
(1) Out of any contract made in this State or to be performed in this
State....
1971]
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satisfy the requirements of due process-by declining to base jurisdiction
solely upoif the contract's being made in North Carolina.
After deciding that the contract was executed in North Carolina, the
court in Goldman turned to the issue of whether the contract had a
"iubstantial connection" with the state. That particular phrase had been
used previously to interpret the second condition of the statute: "con-
tracts to be performed in this State." In those cases in which the contracts
had been made in other states,'0 the courts needed to determine to what
extent the performance itself had to be within North Carolina before the
statute and due process were satisfied. In Byham v. National Cibo House
Corp.," the court decided that "[ilt is sufficient for the purposes of due
process if the suit is based on a contract which has substantial connection
with the forum state,"'" or in other words, is to be performed substantially
within North Carolina. Goldman seems to stand for the proposition that
whether a contract is made within the state is one of the factors to be
considered in deciding if the contract has a "substantial connection" with
the state,' 3 and thus whether due process requirements are met. The
decision merges execution and performance into factors of a single test,
rather than considering them separate tests as a reading of the statute
might suggest.
The Goldman opinion is not particularly illuminating as to how the
factors making up a "substantial connection" are to be weighed. As
noted above, the North Carolina statute allows jurisdiction based upon
contracts which were not made within the state.'4 But it is not a logical
step to say that the court would allow jurisdiction based upon a contract
o "E.g. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966) ; 1lyham v.
National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
"265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).12Id. at 57, 143 S.E.2d at 232.
"The Supreme Court, in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957), used the phrase "'substantial connection" in describing all aspects of the
contract's connection with the forum state. The language in the Goldwan opinion
indicates the term is used broadly:
In the instant case the contract in question clearly met the requirement
of "substantial connection" with North Carolina. It was made in this State.
Plaintiff, under the terms of the contract, solicited business in thirty or more
North Carolina cities and towns . . . . He devoted a larger part of his
time to promoting defendant's business in North Carolina than in any other
state and did in fact sell a quantity of dresses manufactured by the de-
fendant to customers within this State.
277 N.C- at 229, 176 S.E.2d at 788.
" See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 49
LONG-ARM STATUTES .,
wAich was made in North Carolina but not to be performed there, since
t e requirements of due process read additional standards into the statute.-
There is, as yet, no North Carolina decision concerned with whether'
the making of a contract within the state is, in itself, a sufficient connection
to subject the foreign corporation to suit there. 5 A somewhat similar
problem was before the United States Supreme Court in McGee v. In-
ternational Life I-nsurance Corp.,6 where the Court allowed California
to exercise personal jurisdiction over an Arizona insurance company
which had solicited a California resident's business by mail. But McGee
cannot be cited for the proposition that the making of any commercial
contract within a forum state is sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts
required for due process, because, as the Court stressed in Hanson v.
Denckla,'7 insurance is "an activity that the State treats as exceptional and
subjects to special regulation."'18 Indeed, in Hanson the Court stated that
"it is a mistake to assume that this trend [toward relaxation of minimum
contacts requirements] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on
the personal jurisdictions of state courts.""9 Minimal contacts are still a
prerequisite.
The touchstone case involving the North Carolina long-arm statute
is Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.2" There the contract
was made in New York and called for a single shipment of goods from
New York to North Carolina. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the requisite minimum contacts were not present in this situation.
In the course of its opinion, the court discussed21 Compania de Astral,
"' The Goldman opinion is elusive on this point. Although the court is careful
to set out the extent of the performance (both actual and contemplated) within
North Carolina, the point is made that
clearly the North Carolina Legislature, by the express words of the statute
authorizing such service on a foreign corporation when the contract was
made in North Carolina, sought to give its courts the power to assert juris-
diction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the due
process amendment.
277 N.C. at 229-30, 176 S.E.2d at 788-89 (emphasis added). This latent ambiguity
may allow the case to be cited as a chameleon precedent-assuming the color either
of an argument that a contract alone is enough, or that more is required.
10355 U.S. 220 (1957).
17 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
81d. at 252. The discussion of McGee in Goldmn does not explicitly recog-
nize this distinction. Jurisdiction based upon a single contract may turn on a
number of factors. See Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
19 357 U.S. at 251.
20239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
21Id. at 508.
10711 E41
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S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.,2 2 which had been cited by the plaintiff for the
proposition that the mere making of a contract within the forum state is
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when the long-arm statute so allows. In
Erlanger the court said that Astral does not rest on that basis." The
inference would seem to be that the court would not be impressed simply
by the execution of a contract within the state without more. The Erlanger
court, in explaining its holding, said:
The orderly and fair administration of the laws throughout the nation
is a highly important factor to consider. We cannot shut our eyes to
the disorder and unfairness likely to follow from sustaining jurisdiction
in a case like this. It might require corporations from coast to coast
having the most indirect, casual and tenuous connection with a State to
answer frivolous law suits in its courts. To permit this could seriously
impair the guarantees which due process seeks to secure.
24
Does it make sense to say that the connections with North Carolina would
be substantially less "indirect, casual and tenuous" if the Erlanger con-
tract had been made in the state upon its deposit into a mailbox? To base
a decision on that ground would be to ignore the reasons behind the
requirement of minimal contacts with the forum state. Contracts with
foreign corporations would involve "battles of the forms" in which the
out-of-stater would design its paperwork so that the last act would have
to be done in its own state.25
Byham v. National Cibo House Corp.28 is very similar to Goldman
on its facts. In Byham, a North Carolina resident sued a foreign corpora-
tion on a cause of action arising from a franchise contract. The contract
was made in Tennessee and authorized a pizza house in North Carolina
under the defendant's franchise. The defendant sent a representative to
-205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). A
dissenting opinion is found at 108 A.2d 372 (1954).
21 239 F.2d at 508 n.4. In Astral the Maryland court allowed personal juris-
diction, pursuant to its statute, over a Panamanian corporation. The suit was based
on the breach of a contract made in Maryland for the sale of three ships. However,
to find jurisdiction, the court did not look just to the fact that the contract was
made there. Instead, it also noted that the ships in question were in Maryland
and that the funds for the purchase were held in escrow in Baltimore. It concluded
that there was "considerable contact with this State and considerable reliance upon
its laws and the protection which they afforded." 205 Md. at 261-62, 107 A.2d at
367.
"21239 F.2d at 507 (citations omitted).
"See Golden Belt Mfg. Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 281 F. Supp. 368
(M.D.N.C. 1967), affd per curiam, 391 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1968)." 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
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help find a location for the business. The court found a "substantial con-
nection" with North Carolina on these facts."' In Goldman the contract
was made within the state but no representative entered. Parkland's
activities in the state came about through the actions of its agent, Gold-
man. At first blush it appears that Goldman, by his own actions, created
personal jurisdiction over Parkland. But this was done pursuant to an
agreement with the foreign corporation, which was the beneficiary of the
activities. And the agreement (just as the one in Byham) contemplated
a continuing relationship between the parties, not just a single trans-
action as in Erlanger. Considering the two cases together, it is unrealistic
to say that just the making of a contract within the state in Goldman takes
the place of the temporary entry of a representative in Byha;n to supply
the substantial connection. This area of the law depends heavily on a case
by case analysis and does not lend itself to facile comparisons. ]But it seems
apparent that the North Carolina court views the place of the contract's
completion as only one factor to be considered in finding a substantial
connection between the contract (and thus the foreign corporation) and
the state. The inference from Goldman and the other cases discussed here-
in seems to be that the mere fact that the contract on which the cause of
action arises was made within the state is not enough by itself to sustain
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.28
ELMER LISTON BisnoP, III
Professional Responsibility-Canon 6 and the Lender's Attorney
An ethical problem recently arose in a situation in which an attorney
was employed by a lending institution to make a title search and close a
secured loan. The transaction was completed and the note and deed of trust
27Id. at 61, 143 S.E.2d at 234.
8 holding that execution in North Carolina is alone sufficient for jurisdictioi
would be inconsistent with the other phrase of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a) (1)
(1965), which subjects foreign corporations to suit within the state on causes of
action based on contracts "to be performed in this State." See note 9 and accom-
panying text supra. This has been construed to mean performance to a sub-
stantial degree. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966);
accord, Golden Belt Mfg. Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 281 F. Supp. 368
(M.D.N.C. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 391 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1968). It would be
anomalous for the court to allow the mere fact of execution in North Carolina,
no matter how fortuitous the circumstances, to be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
while insisting that otherwise a substantial degree of performance within the state
must be shown.
19711 CANON 6
